

The background image shows a busy street in Rio de Janeiro with several buses and cars. A large, curved, metallic structure, possibly a bridge or overpass, is visible in the upper left. The entire image is covered with a semi-transparent blue filter. The text is overlaid on this image.

# **Rio de Janeiro: New Governance and Procurement Models in COVID times**

**Transport and Climate Change Week**

Rio de Janeiro City Hall  
Municipal Transportation Department  
22 June 2021

# Rio de Janeiro's Bus Transport System

## Overview




# The Bus System in Rio de Janeiro (SPPO)

## General Context


- **Concessions effective from 2010 to 2030** (renewable), including conventional bus lines and a BRT system.
- Several lawsuits in progress, **preventing fare readjustments**.
- **Remuneration based solely on fares**.

## Market organization

- Contracts were formalized between the Transportation Department (SMTR) and **4 concessionaires**.
- 4 concessionaires are actually consortiums of private operators, **totaling 45 companies**.
- **The BRT was not operational at the signature date** and its operation was divided and delegated to the conventional system's operators.
- In 2015, operators constituted an operational consortium for BRT and, in 2019, it was **rearranged as a SPE**.




# Structural challenges



# The COVID-19 imposed a severe crisis...

- **Crisis of the conventional system and BRT is worsening year by year** due to adverse incentives of the fare based remuneration scheme, and it was severely aggravated by the **COVID-19 pandemic**.



- Total number of passengers dropped year after year:

2015: **1.3 Billion**

2019: **1.0 Billion**

2020: **552 Million**

- **16 out of the 45** bus operators went bankrupt.
- Other **7 operators** face **judicial recovery**.

- Conventional system operating with **40% of planned fleet** (2,997 out of 7,568)
- **Extinction of 161** of conventional **bus routes** and **20% of BRT services**
- BRT operating with **50% of planned fleet** (150 out of 300).
- **45 out of 134 BRT stations** are inactive, 34%.
- Almost **20% evasion rate** in the BRT.




# ... but also, an opportunity



## Unsustainability of the Current Model

- The pandemic only accelerated a tendency that was already present: **The current contractual scheme is not sustainable.**
- Urgent demand of financial aid by the transport operators **give the Transportation Department leverage for major restructuring.**



## Legal Imperative for Electrification

- **The Municipal Sustainable Development Plan** defines the target of electrifying 20% of SPPO's fleet until 2030.
- **C40 Green & Healthy Streets Declaration (Municipal Decree nº 46081/2019):** As of 2025, any new fleet provision contract must predict the entrance of zero emission vehicles.



## Compromised Mandate and Collaboration

- The mayor prioritized the revamp of the Bus System's governance as **one of his main mandate objectives**
- **Institutional collaboration** with multilateral institutions (CAF, C40, iCS, ITDP, WB, WRI).

# Transitioning to a new Model

Reformulation of Rio's Bus  
System




# Structural Review of System Management

## Separation of responsibilities and better allocation of risks


- ① **Fare collection system** for centralized collection with independent management and eventual subsidy.
- ② **BRT system bidding** with sectioning of fleet provisioning and operation activities, and payment at cost and incentives to improve the service.
- ③ **New remuneration scheme** for the remaining of the SPPO contract.
- ④ **Terminals and stations** for better exploitation of commercial and advertising spaces.

**Current model**  
full concession,  
without financial guarantees



Responsibilities for  
BRT and SPPO

**Enhanced Model**  
sectional concession, with  
financial guarantees



Public garages and infrastructure improvements in the existing BRT system, a condition for attracting bids



# New Remuneration Scheme

## Current Scheme



Fare Based  
Remuneration

- Operators compete for passengers
- Prioritization of rentable lines
- Few incentives for quality consistency

## New Scheme

Valid only after the implementation of the Fare Collection Model



Main share **based on the costs of the planned service**



Penalty and Incentives based on **KPIs of executed service**



Demand and Productivity gains/loss sharing factor

## Vision

- ★ Enhancement of monitoring, planning and regulation capabilities of the transportation department: **“only the delivered services will be paid”**
- ★ **Less pressure over users’ budget** as public fare is not anymore the main revenue leverage.
- ★ **Incentives for continuous quality and efficient enhancement**
- ★ **Operators focus on points they have control and know-how over:** the operation
- ★ **Reduced exposure to demand risk for the operators**

# New Fare Collection System

## Challenges

- Today, **the fare collection system is responsibility of the transport operators**, and is operated by “their” company, *RioCard*.
- This scheme constitutes a “*black box*” for SMTR, that has almost **no visibility over ticketing data**.
  - **No access to real time data** for planning.
  - **Impossibility of dimensioning and providing subsidies** for the system.
- *RioCard* is the only player in the state market, making future integration a challenge.

## Main Objectives


- **User-friendly** service.
  - **Financial transparency**.
  - Transport management and **planning based on accurate data**.
  - **Better responsibilities allocation**: Enhancement of risk allocation and investments attractiveness .
  - **More regulation power** to the transportation department.
- ★ **Financial and guarantees structuring** for other projects (e.g. BRT bidding).

# BRT System Bidding

International best practices evidence indicates that the **separation between the concession of the system's operation and the fleet provision** is the way to guarantee the quality of the services, enable electrification, reduce risks and increase the attractiveness of the bidding.


## Santiago

### Bid for 1200 buses




## Bogotá


### Bidding for up to 1314 buses



## Londres



## Singapura



# Bidding Model

Analysed Points	Integral Model	Separate Model	Comments
Specialization in tasks	X	✓	Specialized actors for each of the demanded tasks.
Monopoly control	X	✓	Market segmentation reduces the risk of dependency on specific actors.
Project Bankability	X	✓	Development banks and financial entities tend to prefer the separate model.
Competitiveness	!	✓	Larger potential for innovative business models, partnerships and proposals submission.
Service provision continuity	!	✓	The bankruptcy of current operators put the service continuity at risk.
Flexibility	!	✓	Actor specific contract conditions, scopes and regulation rules, enabling punishment or replacement by performance
Project Cost	✓	!	The entrance of a new actor will make the project more expensive and hard to manage, but there is more opportunities to access capital with the separation.
Interface with current model	✓	!	Market Studies and communication plan to draw and execute a strategy for attracting new players.
Public sector and legal know - how	✓	!	More pressure over the control institutions.



# Separation Model Option

Fleet operation and provision separation allow 3 options for proposals:

Bogotá		Santiago
Joint	Parallel	Sequential
<b>Joint proposal between provider and operator</b> (formalised with a deal between both parts). Most of the proposals were received in this modality.	<b>Two separate and parallel proposal for provider and operator.</b> In case one of the biddings don't receive proposals, it would be only necessary to bid the other one again.	<b>First, a bidding for providers and then, a following bidding for operators,</b> that present their proposals based on a providers short list.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mitigate interface risks and facilitate the relationship.</li> <li>• Faster process</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• More independency between actors</li> <li>• Risk of receiving no proposals can make the project more complex.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reduced costs of bidding but longer deadlines</li> </ul>
<b>Suggested model</b>	Not prioritized	Not prioritized



# Separation of Bids

Bidding	Actor Type	Scope of Responsibilities	Remuneration Cost Basis
<b>BRT Fleet Operation</b> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Bus Operators</li> <li>• Transport Operators</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• BRT Operation</li> <li>• Fleet Maintenance</li> </ul>	<b>OPEX</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Operation:</b> Fuel, running-in, lubricants, parts and accessories.</li> <li>• <b>Manpower:</b> Crew wages and social charges, not including wage charges.</li> <li>• <b>Management:</b> Maintenance and inspection personnel, administration, operation of terminals, stations and CCO.</li> </ul>
<b>BRT Fleet Provision</b> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Manufacturers</li> <li>• Bus Bodyworkers</li> <li>• Energy Companies</li> <li>• Asset Managers</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• BRT Fleet Provision</li> <li>• Depots infrastructure (terrains provided by City Hall)</li> </ul>	<b>CAPEX</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Fleet Investment:</b> Remuneration on investment in vehicles and on-board equipment.</li> <li>• <b>Management:</b> Administration and personnel expenses.</li> <li>• <b>Depots Infrastructure:</b> Remuneration on infrastructure investments</li> </ul>

# Depots

## Subestações Light


 Todos os itens

## Ícone Garagem

 Não

 Avaliar

 Escolhida




# Fleet Pipeline

## Packages

#	New Fleet	Delivery Semester
1	~200	2022-S1
2	~170	2022-S1
3	~140	2023-S1
-	~ 490	-

*Figures to be confirmed*

## Depots



# Main challenges

Designing a model for the entrance of zero emissions fleet



# Three sets of problems



## Legacy Issues

- The lack of **monitoring and control tools** and overall a **fragile regulation environment**.
- **Defining a cost-based remuneration scheme**, not having historical data on prices and consumption factors.
- Leveling the playing field for **attracting new agents**, in a context of well established operators.



## Technical Viability

- **Finding and making terrains** available for future depots, considering the demand for **energy infrastructure**.
- **Unavailability of articulated electric vehicles** in the national market.
- **Lack of expertise in electrical infrastructure** vis-à-vis well known diesel requirements.



## Concession Modeling

- **Lack of experience with model** from providers and operators.
- Overall **Risks and Responsibilities allocation** (e.g. over infrastructure construction and maintenance).
- **Defining indicators** for penalties and incentives.
- Evaluating **proposals on different technologies**.



The background image shows a busy street in Rio de Janeiro with several buses and cars. A large, curved, metallic structure, possibly a bridge or a large sculpture, is visible in the background. The entire image is overlaid with a semi-transparent blue filter.

# **Rio de Janeiro: New Governance and Procurement Models in COVID times**

**Transport and Climate Change Week**

Rio de Janeiro City Hall  
Municipal Transportation Department  
22 June 2021